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1 Introduction 
Support for collective action by farmers in both developed and developing countries 
attracts a relatively high degree of policy attention. In the European Union (EU), farmers’ 
cooperation has been supported under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) since 2001, 
through the recognised producer organisations (POs). This policy action is motivated 
primarily by the ongoing concentration of downstream and upstream firms in the food 
chain, which puts farmers in a disadvantageous position when negotiating terms of 
trade, or setting up contractual relations. Other market pressures faced by farmers 
include increasing consumer demand for high-quality diverse food products and the rise 
and spread of food quality standards. Policy support for promoting cooperative behaviour 
is based on the assumption that acting collectively should allow farmers to cope more 
effectively with these market challenges than when acting individually (Ostrom 1990; 
Cook and Chambers 2007; OECD 2013; Fałkowski and Ciaian 2016). 
There is relatively extensive literature analysing the cooperative behaviour of farmers. 
The literature has studied, among other things, governance structure and enforcement 
mechanisms of cooperative behaviour (e.g. Hakelius 1996; van Bekkum and van Dijk 
1997; MacLeod 2007; North et al. 2009); social capital, trust and attitudes towards 
cooperative behaviour (e.g. Hansen et al. 2002; Ollila et al. 2011; Zheng et al. 2012); 
group heterogeneity and collective action (e.g. Varughese and Ostrom 2001; Francesconi 
and Wouterse 2015); dynamics of cooperative organisations’ development (Cook and 
                                          
1 This report is based on Michalek, Ciaian and Pokrivcak (2018). The authors are solely responsible for the 
content of the paper. The views expressed are purely those of the authors and may not in any circumstances 
be regarded as stating an official position of the European Commission. 
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Chambers 2007); and the impact of POs on smallholders’ market access (Staal et al. 
1997; Chirwa et al. 2005). The literature investigating the impact of POs (or other forms 
of collective action) on their members’ performance is relatively limited and produces 
mixed findings, as well as it is focusing predominantly on developing countries (e.g. 
Bernard et al. 2008; Vandeplas et al. 2013; Duvaleix-Tréguer and Gaigné 2015; 
Verhofstadt and Maertens 2015). Most of the available studies assess the performance of 
POs as whole (Van Herck 2014).  
This report contributes to the literature by estimating farm-level impacts of PO 
membership, as well the efficiency of support granted to POs under the EU Rural 
Development Programme (RDP). We employ the propensity score matching and 
difference in differences (PSM-DID) approach, using 939 observations of large 
commercial farms in Slovakia for 2006 and 2015.  
This study is particularly relevant as it analyses the performance of POs in a new EU 
Member State (MS) (i.e. Slovakia). In general, the penetration of POs in new MSs is 
much lower than in old MSs (e.g. OECD 2013; COPA-COGECA 2015). It has been widely 
argued that long periods under communist regimes in new MSs in Central and Eastern 
Europe have negatively affected the level of social capital and attitudes towards 
cooperative behaviour (e.g. Lovell 2001; Paldam and Svendsen 2001; Fidrmuc and 
Gërxhani 2008; Fałkowski and Ciaian 2016). This report attempts to shed light on 
whether POs can generate benefits for farmers in the context of a new MS socio-
economic environment. It is often argued in the literature that small farms are in a 
better position to gain from cooperative behaviour, while there is less scope for large 
farms to engage in such actions (e.g. Chechin et al. 2013; Ma and Abdulai 2016). For 
example, Chechin et al. (2013) have shown that farm size is negatively correlated with 
commitment to collective action. Larger farms are likely to benefit less from cooperation 
with other farmers because they have a higher bargaining position as well as better 
ability to access input and output markets. Further, large farms are found to be more 
inclined to exit POs because of their stronger bargaining position, potentially causing a 
high failure rate of established POs with a high proportion of large members (Ollila 1985; 
Ollila et al. 2011). This report tries to shed some light in this discussion by providing 
empirical evidence of the impact of PO membership on large commercial farms in 
Slovakia. Finally, the report attempts to provide evidence on the effectiveness of the PO 
support granted under the RDP. This is an important policy question given that the 
functioning of EU food chains, and in particular the improvement of farmers’ positions in 
the supply chain, is subject to policy intervention in the current CAP, as well being under 
intensive discussion for the post-2020 CAP reform (EP 2011, 2016; European 
Commission 2013, 2017). Although the support provided for POs within the CAP has a 
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relatively long history,2 there is little empirical evidence on its effects on the EU farming 
sector (Fałkowski and Ciaian 2016). 
The report is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature on 
the impact of POs on farm performance. Section 3 discusses the role of the government 
and the conceptual challenges of setting up efficient state support for POs. Section 4 
describes PO support in Slovakia. Sections 5 and 6 present the estimation approach and 
data used in the report, respectively. Section 7 describes the estimated results. Finally, 
Section 8 draws the main conclusions and policy implications. 
2 Producer organisations and farm performance: 
findings from the literature 
The small size of farms relative to downstream and upstream companies leads to 
increasing cooperation among farmers to enhance and concentrate their bargaining 
position in the food supply chain, and thus to contribute to the improvement of their 
economic performance. Two main forms of cooperation can emerge between farmers: (i) 
bargaining cooperatives/organisations (horizontal organisations), or (ii) supply and/or 
marketing cooperatives/organisations (vertical organisation). The main purpose of 
bargaining organisations is to improve farmers' negotiating power with buyers to achieve 
a higher price and better terms of trade. Given that bargaining organisations represent 
larger production volumes, it gives them greater market power and allows them to be 
more effective in negotiations than individual farmers. Besides improving the bargaining 
position of farmers, supply and/or marketing organisations are also involved in 
processing agricultural and food products, to add value to members’ products and to 
extract a greater share of returns along the food chain. Other areas of cooperation 
among farmers may involve joint supply or service provision. Supply cooperation aims to 
reduce input costs for members by making large-scale purchases of inputs such as 
seeds, fertilisers, fuel, etc. Service cooperation aims to provide members with 
specialised services, such as advice on farm practice, technology adoption, food quality 
standards, market intelligence, etc., which is usually more costly if acquired individually 
by farmers. Note that the form of cooperation between farmers may include a 
combination of the above functions (USDA 2000; Sexton and Lavoie 2001).  
Theoretical studies show that there are various channels through which POs’ farm 
membership affects farm performance. POs can help farmers to improve their 
                                          
2 In the EU, farmers’ cooperation in the fruit and vegetable sector has been supported under the CAP through 
recognised POs since 2001, and since 2011 in the milk sector. The 2013 CAP reform extended this form of farm 
cooperation to all agricultural sectors. The CAP aims in particular to strengthen through POs the bargaining 
position of farmers in the food supply chain. Other policy aims of the CAP with respect to POs are the improved 
market promotion of members’ products; optimisation of production costs; technical assistance for 
environmental protection, farm practices and food standards; and in general a more coordinated response to 
market pressures. 
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productivity and profitability through strengthening their bargaining position in the 
supply chain, by facilitating better responses to changing consumer preferences 
(environment, food quality) or by reducing their transaction costs of input and output 
market access. They may reduce market risks, associated with a greater capacity to 
diversify products and markets, or, when they integrate downstream (e.g. feed mills, 
genetic services) and upstream activities, they may add value to their members’ raw 
products through innovation, product quality and product differentiation. POs can 
address market failures in environments where markets do not function well by 
countervailing the presence of holdup problems, monopolies, credit market 
imperfections, etc. (Kyriakopoulos et al. 2004; Cook and Plunkett 2006; Valentinov 
2007; Alho 2015). However, the extent to which POs succeed in delivering benefits to 
their members depends on their ability to offset a collective action problem, such as a 
free-rider problem, collective decision-making costs, constraints related to members’ 
commitment to collective action, etc. (Cook and Plunkett 2006; Hernández-Espallardo et 
al. 2013). 
Depending on the type, POs can generate benefits at farm level or from collective 
investments at PO level. Cook and Plunkett (2006) distinguish two types of PO: (i) a 
‘traditional’ (defensive) form of cooperation established as a response to market failures 
such as holdup problems or market power (e.g. bargaining organisations); and (ii) a 
vertically integrated (offensive) organisation (e.g. marketing/processing cooperatives). 
According to Cook and Plunkett (2006), the primary objective of a ‘traditional’ 
(defensive) PO is to safeguard returns at farm level to increase returns from farm-level 
investments, rather than to generate returns at the PO level. The POs that evolved into 
more vertically integrated (offensive) organisations, besides attempting to generate 
gains at farm level, also attempt to extract rents from collective investments, including 
investments in processing activities, distribution facilities, intangible assets such as 
brand name, etc. These characteristics of POs have important implications for empirical 
analysis. To identify the gains POs generate for their members, one needs to assess the 
performance of both POs and farmers in the case of vertically integrated (offensive) POs. 
This is because gains might occur through both better terms of trade and the economic 
valuation of the vertically integrated organisation (joint assets), which might not be 
translated into farm income (e.g. if profits from POs are paid in the form of dividends, or 
are reinvested in collective investments). In traditional (defensive) POs, the gains occur 
primarily at farm level; hence it is desirable to use a farm-level approach to assess PO 
membership performance. Approaches that evaluate the performance of POs as a whole 
will fail to identify the membership effect of traditional POs. 
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Most of the available empirical studies assess the performance of POs as whole (Ferrier 
and Porter 1991; Oustapassidis 1992; Van Herck 2014). The empirical literature 
investigating the impact of POs (or other forms of collective action) on their members’ 
performance is relatively limited and produces mixed findings, as well focusing 
predominantly on developing countries (e.g. Bernard et al. 2008; Ito et al. 2012; 
Abebaw and Haile 2013; Vandeplas et al. 2013; Duvaleix-Tréguer and Gaigné 2015; 
Verhofstadt and Maertens 2015; Chagwiza et al. 2016; Latynskiy and Berger 2016). In 
developing countries the fundamental objective of POs is to address market 
imperfections constraining farmers’ market participation (commercialisation) and access 
to high-value (international) markets, and POs are often promoted to address rural 
poverty, particularly for small farming households. POs are widely seen as a tool for 
reducing market barriers related to farmers’ transaction costs of accessing input and 
output markets, credit, market information, technologies, food safety standards and 
certifications (Markelova et al. 2009; Chagwiza et al. 2016; Latynskiy and Berger 2016). 
In developed countries, the primary objective of POs is to rebalance the bargaining 
position of farmers to ensure a more equitable distribution of income along the food 
supply chain, as well as to facilitate better responses by farmers to changing market 
conditions (e.g. changes in consumer preferences, quality standards).  
The empirical literature focusing on PO members’ performance and developed countries 
has analysed among other things how farm performance is affected by PO typology 
(Duvaleix-Tréguer and Gaigné 2015), farmers’ perceived (self-reported) valuation of 
benefits from membership of agricultural producer cooperatives (Alho 2015), the 
importance and type of members’ social capital for cooperative action (Ollila et al. 2011), 
and factors that determine whether or not farms join POs (Szabó et al. 2017; Zohra and 
Zago 2017). 
Duvaleix-Tréguer and Gaigné (2015) investigated the impact of different PO types 
(marketing, supply, bargaining or multipurpose cooperatives) on the cost structure and 
the margins of French hog farmers. Their estimates show that different PO types affect 
farmer performance in different ways. According to their estimates, supply cooperatives 
that integrate downstream activities (e.g. feed mills or genetic selection) perform better 
than other POs studied (i.e. marketing, bargaining or multipurpose cooperatives). 
Members of the supply cooperatives attain the lowest marginal costs and among the 
largest margins relative to members of other PO types. These results could be caused by 
the self-selection effect, given that larger farms prefer to join a type of cooperative that 
exhibits sufficiently high economies of scale (cost advantage), causing lower costs and 
greater margins, and also given that these POs are able to pass scale economies 
obtained from integrated downstream (backward) activities on to farmers. The lowest 
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performance is shown by farms that are members of bargaining POs. These farms have 
the highest marginal costs and achieve negative margins because they are smaller on 
average and thus appear unable to benefit from the scale economies required to achieve 
higher margins. The results of Duvaleix-Tréguer and Gaigné (2015) further suggest that 
farm members of multipurpose marketing cooperatives (i.e. cooperatives that integrate 
downstream activities and processing activities) realise significantly lower output prices 
than other hog farms, which calls into question the efficiency of the multipurpose 
cooperatives’ strategy. Overall, the results of Duvaleix-Tréguer and Gaigné (2015) 
suggest that large farms are in a better position to benefit from POs, as they may be 
more able to benefit from the economies of scale generated by POs. 
Alho (2015) analysed self-reported valuation of benefits from the membership of 
agricultural producer cooperatives among Finnish dairy and meat farmers and found 
that, overall, farmers place a significant value on several membership benefits provided 
by cooperatives (e.g. stable market channel, competitive producer price, services offered 
by the cooperative). However, self-reported valuations of membership benefits differ 
according to farmer characteristics and type of cooperation, which is in line with the 
findings of Duvaleix-Tréguer and Gaigné (2015). For example, the competitive producer 
price provided by cooperative membership appears to be more important to dairy 
farmers than to meat farmers. The findings of Alho (2015) suggest that both dairy and 
meat farmers perceive a stable channel for selling their production as the most 
important benefit of cooperative membership. This is valid for both large and small 
farmers, although the reduced uncertainty brought by a stable market channel is 
particularly valued by farmers who are investing in farm expansion. 
Ollila et al. (2011) analysed the degree of loyalty (social capital) among Finnish farmers 
to marketing cooperatives. They distinguish three types of social capital: bonding capital 
(characteristic of close social relationships), linking capital (characteristic of relationships 
between asymmetric bodies) and bridging capital (characteristic of normal business 
relationships). Their empirical analysis suggests that bonding capital and bridging capital 
are interrelated; members do not distinguish between them for their cooperative 
motivations, and they represent ‘traditional cooperative values’. Approximately half of 
farmers report ‘traditional cooperative values’ (i.e. bonding capital and bridging capital) 
as motives to join cooperatives, and the other half perceive cooperative membership as 
a normal business relationship (i.e. bridging capital). These findings do not confirm 
widely held expectations that older and smaller farmers are strongly motivated by 
traditional cooperative values, while younger and larger farms are more attracted by a 
standard business relationship. 
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3 Role of government and conceptual challenges to 
efficient state support for producer organisations 
Various studies show that government could play an important role in facilitating the 
development of POs. For this reason, support for cooperation among farmers attracts a 
relatively high degree of policy attention in various countries. However, the question 
remains of how this support should be organised in an efficient manner.  
It must be recognised that any government support for POs operates to an extent in a 
‘knowledge vacuum’, given that the ‘true’ benefits and costs of POs are not fully 
understood. This is related in particular (but not exclusively) to the contribution of POs in 
addressing unequal power distribution throughout the food chain, combating unfair 
trading practices, mitigating distortions in distribution of income along the food chain, 
and determining contractual relationships at various stages of the food chain, the effects 
of which are ultimately expected to be reflected in improved farmer performance 
(Fałkowski and Ciaian 2016).  
The assessment of PO market viability is critical to avoid inefficient deployment of public 
resources, and in particular to avoid the emergence of cooperation solely for the purpose 
of accessing public support. In this respect, it is important to establish rules that 
promote genuine cooperation and avoid ‘artificial’ cooperation with the purpose of rent-
seeking and extraction of public resources. In new EU MSs, concerns have been raised 
that some POs were established solely to take advantage of available financial support, 
and will be dissolved as soon as that support finishes. A similar argument was raised by 
Meinzen-Dick (2009) and Hoff and Stiglitz (1993), who suggest that POs are often 
dormant (or passive) in developing countries because they were established largely to 
attract external support and thus lack an economic justification. Further, POs set up in a 
top-down approach (e.g. by state agency) or by third parties (e.g. processors) may not 
necessarily fully realise potential gains for farmers, and the public support granted to 
such POs might instead be wholly or partly diverted to non-farmers (e.g. Golovina and 
Nilsson 2011). 
There is limited evidence to suggest whether or not there exists an optimal type of 
organisation/governance of POs that can address the needs of members in the most 
efficient way. As argued above, the empirical evidence tends to suggest that both farm 
characteristics and type of POs affect members’ performance (e.g. Alho 2015; Duvaleix-
Tréguer and Gaigné 2015). Policies that impose a strict organisational/governance 
structure on publicly supported POs may thus lead to the creation of inefficient POs, or 
crowd out market-based forms of cooperation, thus causing an inefficient allocation of 
public resources (Francesconi and Wouterse 2015; Fałkowski and Ciaian 2016).  
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The existence of cooperative behaviour among farmers is usually explained in the 
literature as motivated by market failures in food supply chains (e.g. market power), 
through its potential to reduce transaction costs and to develop ‘countervailing power’ 
able to constrain market power exerted on input and output markets (Sykuta and Cook 
2001; Hendrikse and Bijman 2002; Valentinov 2007). Thus, a policy of supporting 
cooperation among farmers might be desirable from a social welfare perspective in 
situations where market failures are present (e.g. high cost of contract enforcement, 
imperfect information transmission in food chains, market power). However, this implies 
that the benefits of the POs and the PO support are context specific. The benefit of 
cooperation accruing to a cooperative’s members depends on the structure of a 
particular supply chain, and this is equally true in the farming sector. 
Although the above arguments are relatively well understood from a conceptual point of 
view, their empirical applicability becomes problematic. Empirical analysis of the 
effectiveness of public support for POs, and its impact on farmers’ performance in the EU 
and new MSs in particular, but also in other regions and countries, is rather limited and 
does not provide conclusive results (Hellin et al. 2009; Markelova et al. 2009; 
Francesconi and Wouterse 2015; Fałkowski and Ciaian 2016).3 In the following sections 
we attempt to shed some light on whether or not POs and support provided to POs under 
the RDP generate benefits for farmers in the context of a new MS socio-economic 
environment (i.e. Slovakia), characterised by past experience of state-enforced (top-
down) cooperation. 
4 Produce organisation support in Slovakia 
In general, the supported POs in Slovakia tend to be defensive in type (i.e. bargaining 
organisations), according to the classification of Cook and Plunkett (2006). They are 
therefore expected to generate the majority of their gains at farm level. Slovakia started 
to grant POs public support before EU accession in 2004. Prior to joining the EU, PO 
support was granted under the Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (SAPARD). SAPARD was established by the EU as an assistance 
programme to address structural adjustment problems in agricultural sectors and rural 
areas, as well as to help regulatory and administrative harmonisation with the CAP in 
accession countries. 
After EU accession in 2004, Slovakia continued to grant support to POs, as part of the 
RDP of CAP, during the financial period 2004-2006. The objective was to support the 
                                          
3 For example, using data for 500 farmer organisations in Ghana, Francesconi and Wouterse (2015) show that 
programmes offering support for collective action may be counterproductive because they may promote rent-
seeking and crowd out equity capital formation. Further, by setting stringent participation criteria, the 
programme may end up selecting younger organisations and leave out the more consolidated and potentially 
more efficient organisations. 
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establishment, functioning and administrative capacity of POs. Further, the support 
aimed to help PO members to adjust the quantity of production to market demand, to 
undertake joint marketing of products, to increase value added, to harmonise product 
quality, to improve bargaining power and to facilitate delivery to large retailers and 
processors. In total, EUR 11.24 million was allocated to the support of POs in the period 
2004-2006, which led to creation of 38 new POs with 388 participating farms (PRV 
2008).  
The subsequent RDP for the period 2007-2013,4 which is covered by our report, granted 
POs support in a similar way. The programme specifically acknowledges the threat of 
supermarkets’ rising bargaining power, increasing support for closer cooperation among 
small and medium-sized farms. Under the RDP 2007-2013, 66 POs applied for support, 
and 59 of them received it. The total PO support amounted to EUR 16.92 million. By 
production sector, 38 POs were approved in the area of crop production, 15 in milk 
production, four in pork production, and one each in poultry production and cattle 
production. POs in crop production received 59.4% of total support, and the remaining 
40.6% was obtained by POs in animal production. A total of 398 farms were members of 
POs supported within the 2007-2013 RDP (Table 1). 
Table 1: Producer organisations (POs) by sector (31 December 2015) 
Production sector 
Approved 
applications 
Turnout of POs 
(thousands EUR) 
Payments (thousands EUR) 
Contribution 
from EAFRD  
Totala 
Crop production 38 104 556.93 7 544.52 10 059.36 
Milk 15 51 970.33 3 643.26 4 857.68 
Cattle 1 1 086.29 141.34 188.45 
Pigs 4 8 045.56 698.01 930.68 
Poultry 1 3 512.52 669.70 892.93 
Total 59 169 171.63 12 696.82 16 929.10 
Payments for POs 
approved in 2004-2006 34 - 1 343.11 1 874.16 
Source: PPA (Agricultural Paying Agency of Slovakia). 
Notes: EAFRD, European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development. 
aThis column includes the sum of contributions to PO support from EAFRD and from the national budget. 
 
The support was granted to newly established POs and was linked to the value of sales of 
the PO. The support was paid to POs over a five-year period. The annual payment could 
not exceed a maximum limit set beforehand. All major crop and livestock products were 
eligible for support. The subsidies received by POs could be invested in collective 
                                          
4 Note that the period of the this RDP programme was extended to 2014 due to the delayed adoption of the 
new CAP reform for the period 2014-2020. 
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investments (e.g. machinery, transport) or distributed to their members. Most of the POs 
distributed subsidies to their members.  
According to a survey of subjective self-valuation of PO performance by their managers, 
conducted for the ex post evaluation of the RDP 2007-2013 (PRV 2016), the vast 
majority of POs (48 of 59) reported an improvement in the bargaining power of their 
members relative to purchasers of their products (processors, retailers), while 40% of 
POs (23 POs) reported improvement in their bargaining power relative to providers of 
inputs, which resulted in lower prices of inputs or higher quality. Some POs undertook 
joint marketing of their products. Several POs made investment in transport and other 
machinery. Further, according to the survey, the management of 17% of POs thought 
that POs prevent new entrants to the market and reduce competition in the sector.  
The average number of members per PO was seven, while five was the minimum 
number, as set in the 2007-2013 RDP programme. Eight POs had more than 10 
members. POs with more members were mainly in the milk sector. However, the number 
of members could and did change when new farms joined POs, or when farms exited 
POs, during the period of support implementation.  
Interestingly, some farms were members of several POs (in different commodities). Out 
of 398 members of POs, 55% were members of a single PO only, while the remaining 
farms were members of at least two POs. Several POs had the same address, which 
means that one farm coordinated several POs established in different sectors. 
Out of 59 supported POs within the 2007-2013 RDP, 25 (42% of supported POs) were 
still functioning by June 2016, four POs were in the process of liquidation process and 30 
had already been closed down. According to the ex post evaluation, there are several 
reasons for this low survival rate (PRV 2016). First, most POs did not have independent 
professional management. Instead they were managed by one of the participating farms, 
which often led to conflicts between members. Second, in spite of the fact that the 
support was officially intended for small and medium-sized farms, most members of the 
POs were large farms. It appears that the main goal of the PO members was to attract 
public support; when that support came to an end, many POs were dissolved. From the 
perspective of survival, POs in milk were the most successful. Out of 16 milk POs, 11 
remained in operation in 2016 (PRV 2016). 
Figure 1 shows the development of revenues of POs during the period 2008-2014, 
covering the POs supported under the 2007-2013 RDP. The increase in revenues of all 
POs in the first years was caused by the incremental growth of the number of POs, 
whose date of establishment varied. Revenues in 2013 are lower because they do not 
include the revenues of some POs for which the support period had finished. 
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Of 25 POs that continued functioning after the completion of support from the 2007-
2013 RDP, nine continued to have stable or growing revenue in subsequent years, two 
saw their revenues significantly decline immediately after the end of the project and then 
rise slightly, and the remaining 14 POs saw their revenues reduced almost to zero (PRV 
2016). 
Figure 1. Development of producer organisation revenues  
 
Source: PPA (Agricultural Paying Agency of Slovakia). 
 
5 Methodology 
We analyse the impact of farmers’ PO membership (treatment) on their performance, as 
measured by the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), a method widely applied 
in the literature for counterfactual impact analysis of policies (e.g. Démurger and Wan 
2012; Ito et al. 2012; Abebaw and Haile 2013; Hoken and Su 2015; Michalek et al. 
2016; Nilsson 2017). This approach is based on the estimation of the average difference 
in outcome variables (e.g. income), Y, of members (D = 1) and non-members (D = 0) of 
POs. That is, the causal effect of PO membership is the difference between the potential 
outcome with PO membership (treated farms), Y1, and the potential outcome without PO 
membership (untreated farms), Y0: Y1 – Y0. The expected value of potential outcome 
without PO membership is not directly observed. In most non-experimental settings, the 
estimation of the causal effect of a programme uses non-PO member farms as a control 
group. However, this may result in a selection bias, because the selection in or out of the 
PO membership is usually not random, implying that means of Y0 for members (D = 1) 
and Y0 for non-members (D = 0) may differ systematically, even in the absence of the 
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support programme (Heckman and Robb, 1985; Heckman, 1997; Smith, 2000; Smith 
and Todd, 2005). The selection bias is particularly relevant for PO support granted under 
the RDP, because farms self-select whether they do or do not apply for the support. To 
address the selection bias, we define the ATT conditional on the probability distribution 
of observed covariates:  
(1) )1D,p)Z(P,ZXYY(E)Z(ATT 01    
where X is a set of variables representing the pre-exposure attributes (covariates) of 
farms, Z is a subset of X representing a set observable covariates and P is a probability 
distribution of observed covariance Z.  
The estimation of the ATT using the matching estimator (Heckman and Navarro-Lozano 
2004) may be difficult owing to the ‘curse of dimensionality’ of the conditioning problem 
(Black and Smith 2004; Zhao 2005; Todd 2006). Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have 
shown that the dimensionality of the conditioning problem can be significantly reduced 
by implementing matching methods through the use of balancing scores b(Z), such as 
propensity score. For random variables Y and Z and for discrete variable D, the 
propensity score can be defined as the conditional probability of receiving the treatment 
(i.e. being a PO member) given pretreatment characteristics, Z: 
)ZD(E)Z1DPr()Z(p  . According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), if treatment 
is random conditional on Z, it is also random conditional on p(Z): 
(2)    )Y1DPr(,YZ,YD(EE)Z1DPr(,YDE    
so that E(D|Y,Z) = E(D|Z) = Pr(D = 1|Z), which implies that E[D|Y, 
Pr(D = 1)|Z)] = E[D|Pr(D = 1|Z)], where Pr(D = 1|Z) is a propensity score. This implies 
that, when outcomes are independent of receiving treatment conditional on Z, they are 
also independent of treatment conditional on the propensity score, Pr(D = 1|Z). The 
conditional independence therefore remains valid if we use the propensity score p(Z) 
instead of covariates Z or X.  
Estimating a conditional participation probability by employing a parametric method, 
such as probit or logit, semi-parametrically reduces dimensionality of the matching 
problem substantially to one dimension only, that is, univariate propensity score. An 
important feature of this method is that, after individuals have been matched, the 
unmatched comparison individuals can be easily separated out and are not directly used 
in the estimation of treatment effects.  
The propensity score matching (PSM) estimator for the ATT can be written as: 
(3)     )Z(p,0DY(E)Z(p,1DY(E1D)Z(pE 01PSM    
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which corresponds to the mean difference in outcomes over the common support, 
appropriately weighted by the propensity score distribution of PO members (Caliendo 
and Kopeinig 2008).  
5.1 Difference-in-differences propensity score matching estimator 
Whereas the PSM can be applied to control for selection bias on observables at the 
beginning of the programme, a combination of the PSM with DID methods (conditional 
DID estimator) allows for controlling of selection bias in both observables and 
unobservables (e.g. Heckman 1997; Bratberg et al. 2002; Smith and Todd 2005). The 
PSM-DID measures the impact of PO membership by using differences between 
comparable treated farms (D = 1) and control group (non-treated) (D = 0) in the period 
before, t’, and after, t, the PO support implementation: 
(4) nDYDYDYDY it
i
itit
i
it /)]0()1([)]0()1([DID-PSM ''






   
where )0()1(  DYDY
itit
 is the difference in mean outcomes between i PO member and i 
matched non-PO member after the access to the PO support, and )0()1(
''
 DYDY
itit
 is 
the difference in the mean outcome between i PO member and i matched non-PO 
member in the period prior to the programme implementation.  
The PSM-DID estimator thus eliminates differences in the initial conditions (observable 
heterogeneity) and differences between both groups (members and non-members) of 
farms. The first difference, between PO member farms and the control group, eliminates 
general changes common to all farms (members and non-members). The second 
difference in the PSM-DID estimator, which is the change over time within farms, 
eliminates the influence of time-invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity. 
6 Data and approach 
To assess the effect of PO membership and PO support on farm performance, we use a 
commercial farm database for Slovakia for 2006 and 2015 available from the Slovak 
Ministry of Agriculture. The farm database is a system of data collection that takes place 
each year and collects detailed accountancy data for commercial farms. The farming 
sector in Slovakia is dominated by large commercial farms. According to the latest 
available Eurostat data, for 2013, commercial farms account for around 81% of 
Slovakia’s total agricultural area, with an average size of 559 ha per farm. The database 
covers the representative sample of large commercial farms (939 farms) in Slovakia.5 
The average farm size in the sample is 1392 ha, which is greater than that reported in 
                                          
5 The database does not include individual farms, which, according to Eurostat data for 2013, are usually 
small, with 18 ha average farm size and account for approximately 19% of agricultural area in Slovakia. 
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Eurostat for commercial farms. However, the sample size forms a relatively sizeable 
proportion of total utilised agricultural area (UAA) in Slovakia. The sample of 939 farms 
used in this report covers around 68% of UAA in Slovakia. 
The choice of data for 2006 and 2015 is determined by the timing of the application for 
PO support as part of the RDP. This report analyses the impact of RDP support granted 
during the financial period 2007-2013, which was extended to 2014 as a result of the 
delayed adoption of the new CAP reform for the period 2014-2020. The data we employ 
in this report cover one year before the start of the PO support (2006) and one year 
after the end of the support (2015). This allows us to evaluate the impact of farms’ 
membership of POs that received support during the period 2007-2014.  
The farm database allows us to identify farm members of POs with and without support 
granted in the period 2007-2014. Note that only newly established POs could receive 
support in the period 2007-2014; POs with support are newly established organisations, 
whereas POs without support were established before 2007.6 To better identify the effect 
of PO support, we consider several farm groups depending on whether they are 
members of supported or non-supported POs, defined as follows: 
A. all PO members (supported and non-supported) versus non-PO members 
(referred to as all PO members);  
B. members of supported POs versus non-PO members (referred to as supported PO 
members); 
C. members of non-supported POs versus non-PO members (referred to as non-
supported PO members); 
D. members of supported POs versus members of non-supported POs (referred to as 
supported versus non-supported PO members); 
E. members of supported POs that existed in 2015 versus non-PO members 
(referred to as supported PO members existing in 2015). 
The matching of farms in group A (all PO members) compares the performance of all 
farms that are members of at least one PO (treated farms) — independently of whether 
the PO is supported or not — relative to the non-PO members control group (untreated 
farms). This allows us to estimate the overall performance of PO membership over the 
period covered. The matching of farms in group B (supported PO members) aims to 
estimate the impact of PO support by comparing the performance of farms that are 
members of supported POs (and newly established POs) with the performance of the 
control, non-member, farms. The matching of farms in group C (non-supported PO 
members) does the reverse, by estimating the performance of farms that are members 
                                          
6 POs established before 2007 could have received support under the previous SAPARD or RDP programmes. 
This was probably the case because a relatively significant number of POs received support in the past. 
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of non-supported POs (and older POs). The matching of farms in group D (supported 
versus non-supported PO members) enables the performance of farm members of 
supported POs to be compared with that of farms that are members of non-supported 
POs. These estimates will indicate the performance of supported and newly created POs 
to be compared with that of older POs without support during the period under 
consideration. Given that there was relatively high exit rate among supported POs, in the 
matching of farms in group E (supported PO members existing in 2015) we consider a 
more restricted set of farms that are members of supported POs that existed at least 
until 2015, and compare them with non-PO members. These estimates will indicate the 
performance of those POs that survived after the expiration of the support programme.  
The numbers of farms in the various groups available in the database are reported in 
Table 2. In total, 431 farms are members of at least one PO (46% of all farms), of which 
295 (31%) were in POs that did not receive support. The remaining 136 (14%) were 
members of POs that received support during the period 2007-2014. In total, 106 farms 
(11%) were members of supported POs that did not cease their operation until at least 
2015. 
Table 2: Number of farms by farm groups available in the database 
 Number of farms Proportion of total 
number of farms (%) 
All PO members 431 46 
Members of supported POs 136 14 
Members of non-supported POs 295 31 
Members of supported PO that existed in 2015 106 11 
Non-PO members 508 54 
Total number of farms 939 100 
Notes: PO, producer organization. 
 
We consider four outcome variables, Y, as proxies to test farm performance of PO 
membership: farm gross value added (GVA), farm profits, farm employment and labour 
productivity (GVA/annual work unit (AWU)). The purpose of including these variables is 
to capture both the revenue side and the input side of farm performance. We do not 
have detailed information about POs, particularly in which sectors (e.g. meat, dairy, 
cereals, fruits and vegetables) they operate, or what services they provide to members. 
As a result, we cannot assess the impact of PO membership on the price of particular 
products, or particular services offered by POs. Further, the objective of many POs is to 
improve bargaining position on both output and input markets, and to add value to farm 
products. Moreover, some farms might be members of more than one PO, operating in 
different sectors. For this reason we have opted for outcome indicators that measure 
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overall farm performance, such as GVA, profits and employment. These outcome 
indicators are also in line with the policy objectives of PO support which, among other 
things, aims to contribute to the improvement of POs' value added and economic 
viability. 
7 Results 
Table 3 shows the effectiveness of PSM in balancing the PO members and the 
comparison control groups. The results show that matching performed well in balancing 
the observable covariates, with standardised differences between the treated PO 
members and control groups reduced from as high as 50%, before matching, to below 
10%, after matching, for all five matching groups (A to E). However, after matching for 
most covariates, the standardised differences were reduced to less than 5%. Further, 
after matching the differences are no longer statistically significant, suggesting that 
matching reduced the bias associated with observable covariates. The exception is the 
covariate sales from agro-tourism, where the difference is statistically significant after 
matching, but lower than 10%, suggesting that the bias is relatively low. These results 
suggest that matching reduced the differences between treated PO members and the 
non-treatment group by between 80% and 99% for the relevant covariates that are 
statistically significant before matching (Table 3).  
The tests of joint significance of covariates show similar results. The likelihood ratio tests 
were statistically significant before matching and insignificant after matching for all five 
matching groups (A to E). The pseudo-R2 was reduced after matching, compared with its 
value before matching, by a factor greater than 4. The matching reduced the overall bias 
by more than 75%. These tests show that the proposed specification of the propensity 
score has a balanced distribution of covariates, meaning that the differences in the 
covariate means between the treated PO members and the control groups were 
eliminated (Table 4). 
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Table 3: Balancing between groups before and after matching 
  
A. All PO members B. Supported PO members C. Non-supported PO members 
D. Supported versus non-
supported PO members 
E. Supported PO members 
existing in 2015 
  
Difference in 
means between 
treated and 
control (%)† 
Bias 
reducti
on 
(%) 
Difference in 
means between 
treated and 
control (%)* 
Bias 
reductio
n (%) 
Difference in 
means between 
treated and 
control (%)* 
Bias 
reduction 
(%) 
Difference in means 
between treated 
and control (%)* 
Bias 
reductio
n (%) 
Difference in 
means between 
treated and 
control (%)* 
Bias 
reductio
n (%) 
  Before  After Before After  Before  After  Before  After  Before  After  
Total assets 35.2*** 2.2 93.8 46.2*** 0.8 98.3 31.3*** 2.2 93 6.2 1.6 73.4 48.2*** 4.5 90.7 
Fixed capital 33.2*** 2 94 43.3*** 1.3 96.9 29.8*** 1.4 95.4 4.5 0.5 88.2 47.1*** 5.9 87.5 
Value of land 0.2 1.1 404.9 6.7 0.4 93.5 2.4 0.5 78.8 16 2.7 82.9 7.4 1.3 82.4 
Value of buildings 44.8*** 3.9 91.3 58.4*** 0.6 98.9 39.2*** 2.6 93.5 12.7 1.7 86.7 65.4*** 7.2 89 
Value of grass land 5.4 5 7.4 5.5 0.7 86.4 5.3 6.1 13.9 0.6 9.7 1531.3 9.7 4.9 48.8 
Value of livestock 25.1*** 1.1 95.7 39.8*** 6.9 82.7 19.5*** 1 94.7 16.6 1.2 92.7 39.5*** 2.1 94.8 
Financial capital 3.3 4.2 28.9 8.8 2 76.8 0.7 0.1 90.4 10.3 1.7 83 7.6 3.1 58.8 
Variable capital 32.7*** 2.2 93.1 43.7*** 4.1 90.7 28.5*** 3 89.6 8.7 3.1 64.7 43.2*** 1.9 95.5 
Total sales 3.2 1.6 51.3 10 0.9 91.3 0.4 1.2 229.5 18.6 3.1 83.5 10.4 0.6 94.5 
Sales from own production 37.1*** 1.5 96 51.1*** 0.3 99.5 31.5*** 0.5 98.3 12.3 3.5 71.9 49.5*** 1.3 97.3 
Crop production 25.3*** 1 96.2 33.8*** 2.1 93.7 21.4*** 0.9 95.6 11.9 1.4 88.5 30.7*** 2.8 91 
Sales from agro-tourism 
4.4 0.1 97.6 8.5 3.8 55.6 0.1 3.2 2973.3 8.4 9.2 10.1 10.5 
8.7*
* 
16.8 
Total costs 31.4*** 0 99.9 40.6*** 1.7 95.9 27.6*** 0.4 98.7 9.1 2.7 70.2 40*** 1 97.4 
Material and energy costs 37.9*** 0.1 99.7 50.1*** 2.8 94.5 33.2*** 2.5 92.3 9 2.9 67.6 48.9*** 2.8 94.4 
Labour costs 41.3*** 0.3 99.4 58.6*** 1.8 96.9 33.2*** 2.7 91.8 24.2** 3.8 84.3 58.4*** 1.3 97.7 
Bank loans 14.8** 2.7 82 9.2 1.4 84.6 16.7** 0.5 97.3 12.9 0.2 98.1 11.2 1.9 83.5 
Labour 42*** 1.7 96.1 59.9*** 2 96.6 33.5*** 1.7 94.9 26.4** 5.4 79.7 60.2*** 1 98.3 
Total subsidies 31.8*** 2.2 93 37.4*** 1.6 95.8 29.6*** 1.3 95.7 2.4 5.2 111.7 44.8*** 1.7 96.3 
Total land 30.2*** 0.6 98.1 41.6*** 4.7 88.7 25.6*** 0.1 99.6 11 4.4 60.3 46.9*** 2 95.7 
Total LIPIS land 31.6*** 0.7 97.8 44*** 6.8 84.4 26.4*** 0.3 98.7 14 3 78.6 48.2*** 1.2 97.5 
Arable land 30.2*** 0.7 97.8 40.9*** 7.9 80.7 25.6*** 0.4 98.5 12.4 0.3 97.2 37.9*** 1 97.3 
Grass land 14.5** 2.6 82.2 18.2** 1.8 90.1 12.6* 1.3 89.4 6.2 4.9 21 30.2*** 4.6 84.8 
RDP support 22.7*** 5 78 16.3* 3.1 80.7 25.2*** 6.4 74.5 12.8 2.7 78.9 21** 5.5 73.6 
LFA area 20.5*** 1.5 92.6 23.1** 6.3 72.5 19.4*** 3 84.3 2.8 1.3 52.2 35.6*** 3.8 89.4 
Wheat production 26.1*** 1.1 96 40.3*** 0.3 99.3 18.9*** 1.5 92.3 22.4** 2.2 90.1 37*** 4.1 88.8 
Maize production 16.5** 2.7 83.9 19.5** 8.8 54.7 15.2** 0.4 97.2 3.3 1.2 63.6 17.6* 0.3 98.1 
Oilseed production 15.2** 0.1 99.6 25*** 2.5 90 10.6 0.6 94.2 14.2 2 85.9 21.6** 1.1 94.9 
Sugar beet production 21.7*** 3.4 84.4 43.8*** 7.9 82.1 9 1 88.4 37*** 1 97.4 31.7*** 4 87.3 
Potato production 14.2** 0.8 94.4 15.7** 3.6 77 14.7** 0.4 97.2 8.2 2.3 72.4 18.2*** 4.6 74.5 
Milk production 53.5*** 3.4 93.6 95.2*** 8.1 91.5 37*** 3.8 89.7 53.3*** 1.3 97.5 96.6*** 2.7 97.2 
Income before taxes  7.3 1.7 76.9 3.5 0.9 73.2 8.6 5.9 31.6 6.7 0.2 96.4 0.2 2.8 1079.8 
Income before taxes per 
labour unit 
4.4 1.2 72.3 3.4 7.4 114.5 5 1.3 73.3 0.3 1.3 296.6 5.2 4.8 6.8 
Income before taxes 
without subsidies 
21.1**
* 
0 99.8 
33.7**
* 
4.5 86.7 16** 4.1 74.3 13.2 4.5 65.5 
39.9**
* 
0.1 99.7 
* Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; after, after matching; before, before matching; RDP, Rural Development Programme; LFA, less-favoured area; LPIS, Land Parcel 
Identification System. 
†Standardised difference in means (in %) = 100(?̅?𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 − ?̅?𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙)/[(𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑
2 + 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙
2 )]1 2⁄ , where ?̅?𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 and ?̅?𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 are means, and 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑
2  and 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙
2  are variances, in the treated and control groups, 
respectively. 
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Table 4: Matching quality indicators before and after matching  
  Pseudo-R2 Likelihood ratio Bias 
reduction 
(%)   
Before 
matching 
After 
matching 
Before 
matching 
After 
matching 
A. All PO members 0.092 0.008 119.58*** 9.66 92 
B. Supported PO members 0.210 0.036 139.38*** 11.74 90 
C. Non-supported PO members 0.072 0.007 75.98*** 5.77 90 
D. Supported versus non-supported PO members 0.167 0.019 89.98*** 6.72 78 
E. Supported POs members in 2015 0.228 0.056 128.55*** 14.24 93 
Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
PO, producer organisation. 
 
Figure 2 plots the density distribution of propensity scores for the PO members (treated 
farms) and the control non-treated groups for the five matching groups (A to E). The 
horizontal and vertical axes show the estimated propensity score and the frequency of 
observations, respectively. The distribution of control (non-treated farms) farms is 
skewed towards the left, whereas the distribution of PO members (treated farms) 
appears to be relatively more symmetrical. Thus, the observations of PO members 
whose propensity scores are higher than the maximum of control farms are excluded 
from estimations to restrict the farm observations in the region of common support. 
Overall, visual examination of Figure 2 suggests that the distributions of the propensity 
scores for the PO members and the control groups are more similar (and therefore highly 
comparable) after matching. There is evident overlapping of the distributions after 
matching for all five matching groups (A to E). 
The estimated results for PSM-DID are reported in Table 5. The table summarises the 
effects for the four outcome variables considered (farm gross value added, farm profits, 
farm employment and labour productivity) and for all five matching groups (A to E). The 
estimated results show that belonging to a PO increases economic performance (group 
A). PO membership improves farm performance for all four outcome variables. That is, 
farm members of POs increase gross value added by EUR 41 700, farm profits by 
EUR 7345, farm employment by 1.73 AWUs and labour productivity by EUR 620 per AWU 
compared with similar farms that are not members of POs. 
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Figure 2. Propensity score distribution: comparison of before matching (right 
panel) versus after matching (left panel) 
A. All PO members 
 
 
B. Supported PO members 
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C. Non-supported PO members 
 
 
D. Supported versus non-supported PO members 
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E. Supported PO members in 2015 
 
 
Table 5: Impact of PO membership on farm performance: estimated PSM-DID 
results for average treatment effect on the treated 
 Sample size (in 
common support) 
GVA Profits Employment 
Labour 
productivity 
(GVA/AWU)  Treated 
farms 
Control 
farms 
A. All PO members  416 508 +41 700 +7345 +1.73 +620 
B. Supported PO members 118 508 19 287 14 570 +2.141 1155.6 
C. Non-supported PO 
members 
285 508 +60 139 +27 847 +1.548 +39.76 
D. Supported versus non-
supported PO members 
128 295 61 230 54 209 2.074 1324.86 
E. Supported PO members in 
2015 
92 508 18 115 8054 +1.332 1676.8 
AWU, annual work unit. 
 
The DID-ATT estimates suggest that PO support did not have a positive impact on farm 
performance. Farms that were members of POs and received support during the period 
2006-2014 achieved negative values for the outcome indicators compared with similar 
non-PO members (group B). The exception is farm employment, which improves in 
supported PO members relative to the control group (Table 5). The estimated negative 
effect of PO support suggests that the primary objective of many newly established POs 
is to benefit from the support offered rather than to enhance the collective good (i.e. the 
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bargaining position) of their members. Indeed, according to PRV (2016), the dissolution 
of supported POs by the RDP for 2006-2013 was high, with 58% of them dissolved by 
the end of June 2016. This is indirectly confirmed by the estimates for group E, where 
only farm members of supported POs that survived until 2015 were considered in the 
estimations. Farm members of POs that survived until 2015 still show negative 
performance for most outcome indicators, but they perform better in three outcome 
indicators (GVA, profits and labour productivity) than farms that are members of any 
supported POs (group B). This might be because the inefficient POs (including those that 
intended only to benefit from the availability of additional funds) were dissolved, while 
more efficient POs continued to operate, resulting in better performance of PO members 
in group E than in group B.  
In addition, farm members of non-supported PO achieve higher values on all four 
outcome variables considered than the control group of non-PO members (group C). 
Similarly, the non-supported PO members perform better than supported PO members 
(group D). Note that non-supported POs might have received support under the previous 
rural development programmes in the period before that covered by this report (i.e. 
during the RDP for 2004-2006 or under SAPARD). Indeed, a relatively large number of 
POs were supported under past programmes (e.g. 38 POs by the RDP for 2004-2006) 
(PRV 2008). Given that a substantial proportion of non-supported POs received support 
in the past, our estimated results suggest that the previous RDP programme was more 
efficient than RDP 2007-2013 in establishing POs that deliver benefits to members in 
terms of increasing income, value added and labour productivity. However, this is valid 
only for POs that survived and continued their operation after support ended. There 
might also have been some POs that received support in the past (i.e. before 2007) and 
which were dissolved after the finalisation of the support programme, which would 
challenge the potential efficiency of past RDP support allocation. However, we do not 
have data to evaluate the performance of these POs. 
The differences in the estimated effects between group B and group E suggest 
potentially significant inefficiencies in the PO support granted during the period 2007-
2014. POs that survived until 2015 performed better (or generated lower negative 
outcome indicators for their members) than all supported POs during the period 2007- 
2014. That is, farm members of all supported POs (including those that ceased to 
function) performed worse than farm members of the supported POs that survived at 
least until 2015. These results suggest that many low-performing farms (PO members) 
received RDP support without benefiting from a new collective good; the administrative 
procedures (e.g. eligibility criteria, screening process) were not able to detect bad POs 
and separate them from good POs.  
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In fact, the comparison between the supported and the non-supported POs (group D) is 
a comparison between older and younger POs, because only newly established POs could 
receive support during the period 2007-2014, while non-supported POs were established 
before 2007. One reason why older POs might perform better than younger ones is that 
they have probably acquired a more consolidated position in the market, with developed 
business relationships and networks (e.g. with processors, retailers, input providers), 
which allows them to generate benefits for their members from collective activities 
(Francesconi and Wouterse 2015).  
Younger POs need to establish governance structures, invest in collective assets and 
develop business relationships and networks. This usually takes time and may actually 
generate losses for members during the first operating years of the PO, as suggested by 
our estimates. This is supported by the ‘cooperative life cycle’ concept developed by 
Cook and Chambers (2007), according to which growth of POs and greater gains for 
members can be realised after the establishment and design phases, when the rules 
governing the functioning of a PO have been set up. After the initial phases of the life 
cycle, POs may be in position to generate added value for members. 
8 Conclusions 
The RDP supports the establishment of POs in Slovakia with the aim of enhancing the 
bargaining position of farmers in the supply chain, and thus contributing to the 
improvement of their value added and economic viability. The objective of this report is 
to estimate the effectiveness of PO support and the impact of PO membership on farm 
performance in Slovakia. We employ the PSP-DID econometric approach on a database 
of commercial farms for 2006 and 2015. This database allows us to estimate the 
performance of the RDP support granted to newly established POs during the financial 
period 200-2013, and to compare it with that of the non-supported POs.  
Our estimates allow us to derive several conclusions related to the performance of POs 
and PO support. First, the estimation results show that, in general, belonging to a PO 
improves the economic performance of farms in Slovakia. That is, farms that are 
members of POs attain higher profitability, added value, employment and labour 
productivity than farms that are not members of POs. Second, in the short run the 
support granted to newly established POs does not improve their performance in terms 
of delivering economic benefits to members (farmers). It appears that only established 
and older POs (including those supported in the past) are able to generate benefits for 
their members. Third, the estimates provide some indirect evidence that, contrary to the 
policy expectations of the Slovak RDP, the disbursement of PO support granted in the 
financial period 2007-2013 was not always effective in selecting POs with the highest 
potential to generate benefits for their members. It appears that many POs were created 
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for the sole purpose of benefiting from the support on offer. This result is reinforced by 
the observed high closure rate of supported POs after the expiration of the support 
programme.  
The database considered in this report includes predominantly large commercial farms. 
Therefore, we cannot fully extrapolate the result of the potential impact of PO 
membership and PO support on small individual farms. Our results of positive PO 
membership impact on farm performance tend to be in line with the findings of Duvaleix-
Tréguer and Gaigné (2015), which suggest that large farms are also in a better position 
to benefit from POs because they may be more able to benefit from the economies of 
scale generated.  
Our results have important policy implications. The setting of criteria for programme 
participation needs to be improved to ensure the selection of POs with higher growth 
potential. Granting support to newly established POs might not always be an appropriate 
instrument in guiding the allocation of public funds, if the selection criteria are not based 
on objectively verifiable business plans and enterprise performance. This problem might 
be addressed either by making support conditional on achieving a pre-defined 
performance, going beyond the duration of the RDP programme, or by tailoring support 
to more consolidated POs that have records of past performance, or to those farmers 
with a weak bargaining position in the market, where gains from cooperation are 
expected to be greatest. 
When drawing conclusions, one needs to be aware that our findings obviously reflect the 
data limitations and estimation assumptions. First, as argued above, our results cannot 
be extrapolated to all farms in Slovakia; they are valid only for commercial farms which 
are relatively large compared with farm structures in other EU MSs. A second potential 
caveat for our analysis is that, due to the data limitations, we could not take into 
account in our analysis more detailed information about POs (e.g. type of PO, size of PO, 
governance structure, sector, services offered to members) or its implications for PO 
member performance. Third, due to the relatively small number of farms in the 
database, we were not able to analyse how the effects differ between different farm 
typologies (e.g. by farm specialisation or farm size). Therefore, the arguments in this 
report should be interpreted with care. 
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